



Informing and public confession were introduced as his tools of control. When a critic protested against appointment of party secretaries of regions as a retrogression from the elective system of earlier days, he was told that the appointive system represented an advance in party democracy.

Power was concentrated during the period of this volume not only by party reorganization but by state reorganization. A federation created a form for a measure of autonomy in the federating republics, but in practice the constitutional provisions became dead letters because of the subordination of the government apparatus to the party hierarchy. This was made more apparent after Lenin's death by the assignment to government positions of persons of second-rank party standing.

Not all of Carr's explanations ring true. For example, one can quarrel with his assertion that RSFSR codes were copied by the other republics because these latter lacked legal talent. The Ukrainian Republic's little-read law journal of the time provides evidence of Ukrainian legal talent restless under the obligation enforced upon it to follow RSFSR models. The dictation from headquarters was, in fact, even more severe than Carr claims.

Carr's thesis in this volume has been amply documented in recent years by several monographs on the history of the Communist Party, of the Kom-somol, of the Soviet federation, and of judicial institutions. What he says is now known and accepted in the Western world. Still, his volume is rewarding even for authors of the monographs, for he has a concept of the sweep of history that takes impressive form when all the various threads are woven together as they can be only in a monumental study of them all. Previous volumes have been criticized by some reviewers as showing too much of a sense of "inevitability" and failure to assess the alternatives that might have been developed. Given Carr's analysis of Stalin, these alternatives probably seemed unreal to him, and the impression is still given, although in much less distinct form, that it would have been hard to conceive of a Bolshevik-dominated governmental system that could have moved in any other direction, especially with a personality like Stalin's at the helm. Time will tell whether current leaders can reverse the trend, or whether they really hope to do so.

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JOSEPH L. NOGEE, *Soviet Policy Towards International Control of Atomic Energy*. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1961. xiv + 306 pp. \$6.50.

GLENN H. SNYDER, *Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961. vi + 294 pp. \$6.50.

The problem of preservation of peace and of the global political-territorial status quo has been and remains in the forefront of national objectives of the United States. The methods and policies used to achieve these objectives include military deterrence as well as a wide range of diplomatic, political, economic, and other means which seek to reduce or control the levels of

conflict between the West and the Soviet Union. *Soviet Policy Towards International Control of Atomic Energy* and *Deterrence and Defense* both contribute to the clarification and understanding of the problems involved in the use of some of these means.

Professor Noguee's study of Soviet policy, tactics, and objectives during the past fifteen years on the international control of atomic energy is a welcome and valuable addition to our fund of knowledge about Soviet methods of negotiation. It also provides useful background material for studies in the fields of disarmament, arms control, and test cessation.

The book is divided into two sections. The first is a chronological treatment of the negotiations from 1945 to 1960 focused on the Soviet responses to the offers of the United States to internationalize and control the use of atomic energy. The second section contains Professor Noguee's analysis of the "sources of Soviet opposition to the international control of atomic energy" and of the Soviet "gamesmanship" in these negotiations. The author's conclusion that the "outstanding feature of Soviet atomic energy policy has been its consistent and emphatic opposition to international control" (p. 231) is well documented and inescapable. But sabotage of the negotiations was only one of the Soviet objectives, since Moscow sought at the same time to inhibit efforts by the United States to build up its nuclear weapons stock, which it could use to gain political advantages and to exploit the negotiations for political and propaganda purposes.

Professor Noguee's analysis of Soviet motivations and policy calculations places great and possibly excessive emphasis on the Soviet leadership's fear that international control of atomic energy would open the Soviet Union to Western inspection and control over an important segment of its industry. In the light of Stalin's belief in the continuation of the East-West struggle after the war, it is equally evident that the Soviet Union could not accept a position of relative power asymmetry if it failed to develop its own nuclear weapons, since its leaders did not believe in the possibility of long-range stability in East-West relations. The initial apparent Soviet unwillingness to acknowledge the revolution that nuclear weapons had brought to power relations and warfare was probably due in large measure to the desire to deter the United States from exploiting its nuclear monopoly for political purposes as well as to a reluctance to accept the loss of the newly acquired Soviet conventional superiority.

Deterrence and Defense focuses on the complex problem of defining a criterion for developing a military posture which could best satisfy the different and often conflicting requirements of deterrence and defense. These requirements are examined in the light of the East-West balance of power, as well as in the context of defense in an all-out war and of limited aggression in various areas of the world. Unfortunately, any attempt at developing a rational and mathematically calculable system of relationship of forces cannot take fully into account the value of political exploitation of military postures nor the irrational factors of credibility, which change with objectives, national will, and internal pressures.

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